Gad wrote: “If arahants have patisamvedi towards the elements of kāma loka, the same applies to rupa and arupa loka right? An arahant might voluntarily indulge in all jhanas, but he/she will not have ragapatisamvedi like an anagami or anariya yogi.”
- Very good. You understood the concept.
1. Yes. An Anāgāmi will undergo both “rūpa paṭisaṁvedī” and “rūpa rāga paṭisaṁvedī” for the rupāvacara jhānās. But an Arahant will not go through the second step of “rūpa rāga paṭisaṁvedī” while in the jhānās.
- Just like the task of a puthujjana/Sotapanna is to get rid of the step “kāma rāga paṭisaṁvedī,” the task of an Anāgāmi is to get rid of the tendency to attach to those rupāvacara jhānās, i.e., stop going through the “rūpa rāga paṭisaṁvedī.” Note that here “rūpa rāga” is about rupāvacara jhānās.
2. Once an Anāgāmi gets through that step of “not attaching to rupāvacara jhānās, they will become “Arahant-phala Anugāmis” striving to attain the Arahanthood. Thus, they will get into arupāvacara samāpattis.
- Now, their minds will automatically go through “arūpa paṭisaṁvedī” and “arūpa rāga paṭisaṁvedī.”
- Thus, the task of an”Arahant-phala Anugāmi“ is to get rid of the tendency to attach to those arupāvacara samāpattis.
- Once that is done, they become Arahants and only experience “arūpa paṭisaṁvedī” and NOT “arūpa rāga paṭisaṁvedī.”
3. Therefore, it is a step-by-step process of getting released from “kāma loka,” “rupa loka,” and“arupa loka.”
P.S.
Now, we can try to address the following issue that I brought up in the previous thread.
“2. Then the sutta mentions this question by the Buddha: “For Mālunkyaputta, an infant lying on its back, does not have even the concept of identity, so how could the self-identity view arise in him?”
- Have you understood why that is the case?
- The Pali verse is: “Daharassa hi, mālukyaputta, kumārassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa sakkāyotipi na hoti, kuto panassa uppajjissati sakkāyadiṭṭhi?”
- In Sutta Central translation, the same verse is translated as: “For a little baby doesn’t even have a concept of ‘substantial reality,’ so how could substantialist view possibly arise in them?” See “Mahāmālukya Sutta (MN 64.)“
Let me rephrase the question the following way (since now I have explained the difference between sakkāya and sakkāya diṭṭhi with a discussion on “distorted saññā.”)
- “A little baby doesn’t even have a concept of ‘sakkāya,’ (i.e., attachment), so how could sakkāya diṭṭhi (wrong view about attachment) possibly arise in them?”
- Can anyone explain that now?